Charles Kupchan on Grand Strategy

Tell me about your first book, War and Change by Robert Gilpin. 

War and Change was for me the first book which provided a compelling explanation of the rise and fall of great powers over time. There are a lot of books that address this issue and for me Gilpin’s book offers the most straightforward and persuasive in the theory of what it is that causes powers that are at the top of the pecking order to lose, over time, their advantages and eventually be eclipsed by rising challengers.

It is one of the most pervasive patterns in history and one of the patterns that causes the most war in history. In that sense it is a book which is foundational for the study of international diplomacy and conflict. 

And what does Gilpin say are the causes of the fall of these great nations? 

The main theory that he offers is that modes of innovation over time move from the core to the periphery of the international system. The periphery borrows the best technology from the core and gradually it is able to surpass the core by generating better economic growth, better productivity. The economic growth ultimately leads to military power. And so his theory contrasts with, for example, the work of Paul Kennedy. In his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers Kennedy argues that great powers fall because they spend too much on defence. However, I think that empirically Gilpin offers a better explanation of this pattern of rise and fall over time than does Kennedy.

What are some historical examples for examining these theories?

If you look at cases where countries sustain high levels of defence spending, there you do see that such expenditure cuts into economic growth – Japan in the 1930s and Nazi Germany. Israel today spends upwards of ten per cent. You have to get into the double digits to have defence spending cut into your economic performance. But, in general, a country like the United States or Great Britain at its peak wasn’t spending enough to really dampen its performance. Rather what happened is that over time the US overtook Britain due to America’s secular rise. Now it is Asia that is borrowing the best technology and emerging as the new node of innovation and production. One would expect that over the course of this century China would gradually catch up with the United States.

Your next book is Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. 

Yes, this is a more traditional book of diplomatic and naval history than the other Kennedy book I mentioned, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. It charts the rise of Great Britain as a major power – actually, in the early days it was England because it wasn’t called Great Britain until later. He looks at how, when and why this great power was able to essentially rule the world in the 19th century – how it was able to extend its reach on a global basis, attain mastery of the seas, and preserve a stable balance of power in Europe that enabled it to concentrate on the imperial periphery. 

And this was all tied up with its economic growth?

Yes, very much so. Britain first rose economically when it became the workshop of the world and industrialised, and that growth gave it the potential to build a high seas fleet second to none. In fact, Britain was so superior economically that it adopted the Two Power Standard to set its fleet strength: the Royal Navy would remain as powerful as the next two most powerful fleets combined. And that is a level of superiority that is quite impressive especially at a time when other great powers were rising – as they were in the 19th century. 

I think that the book does a superb job of looking at the relationships between economic power and military power and mapping out in strategic terms how Britain went about translating its economic resources and its naval superiority into a level of global hegemony which is very rare in history. 

What about the demise? How does Kennedy tackle that?

He focuses on a combination of two things – one is the secular rise of other powers. By the end of the 19th century the United States is turning on as a great power. Germany after its unification in 1871 is starting to become a major industrial power, generating steel and other war-making materials at a rate that soon catches up with the British. Japan is also industrialising and coming on line as a major power. 

And then, secondly, there is focus in the book on the sources of relative economic decline and its impact on strategy within the UK itself. One of the most interesting periods in the history of British grand strategy is the 1930s, when Britain’s sense of economic vulnerability delayed its rearmament and compelled the cabinet to avoid a continental commitment. In 1938 Chamberlain saw himself as having no choice but to appease Hitler because Britain did not have the capability to do otherwise. Economic constraints help explain the failure of Britain to balance against Nazi Germany.

Your third book is Strategies of Containment by John Gaddis.

I see this book as in some ways the US companion to Kennedy’s Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. I think it is the best synthetic treatment of American grand strategy during the Cold War.