Writing Worth Reading
Writing Worth Reading
This is a book about diplomatic and naval history. It charts the rise of Great Britain as a major power. Kennedy looks at how, when and why Great Britain was able to project its power globally and essentially rule the world in the 19th century.
Your next book is Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery.
Yes, this is a more traditional book of diplomatic and naval history than the other Kennedy book I mentioned, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. It charts the rise of Great Britain as a major power – actually, in the early days it was England because it wasn’t called Great Britain until later. He looks at how, when and why this great power was able to essentially rule the world in the 19th century – how it was able to extend its reach on a global basis, attain mastery of the seas, and preserve a stable balance of power in Europe that enabled it to concentrate on the imperial periphery.
And this was all tied up with its economic growth?
Yes, very much so. Britain first rose economically when it became the workshop of the world and industrialised, and that growth gave it the potential to build a high seas fleet second to none. In fact, Britain was so superior economically that it adopted the Two Power Standard to set its fleet strength: the Royal Navy would remain as powerful as the next two most powerful fleets combined. And that is a level of superiority that is quite impressive especially at a time when other great powers were rising – as they were in the 19th century.
I think that the book does a superb job of looking at the relationships between economic power and military power and mapping out in strategic terms how Britain went about translating its economic resources and its naval superiority into a level of global hegemony which is very rare in history.
What about the demise? How does Kennedy tackle that?
He focuses on a combination of two things – one is the secular rise of other powers. By the end of the 19th century the United States is turning on as a great power. Germany after its unification in 1871 is starting to become a major industrial power, generating steel and other war-making materials at a rate that soon catches up with the British. Japan is also industrialising and coming on line as a major power.
And then, secondly, there is focus in the book on the sources of relative economic decline and its impact on strategy within the UK itself. One of the most interesting periods in the history of British grand strategy is the 1930s, when Britain’s sense of economic vulnerability delayed its rearmament and compelled the cabinet to avoid a continental commitment. In 1938 Chamberlain saw himself as having no choice but to appease Hitler because Britain did not have the capability to do otherwise. Economic constraints help explain the failure of Britain to balance against Nazi Germany.
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Charles Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was Director for European Affairs on the National Security Council during the first Clinton administration. He has served as a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs, Columbia University’s Institute for War and Peace Studies, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales in Paris. During 2006-2007 he was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Henry A Kissinger Scholar at the Library of Congress.
